CSOs Submission to the Special Select Committee on AG-PP Separation Addresses Four Key Concerns Regarding Accountability of the Public Prosecutor

CSOs Submission to the Special Select Committee on AG-PP Separation Addresses Four Key Concerns Regarding Accountability of the Public Prosecutor

Kuala Lumpur, 2 April 2026: The proposed separation of the roles of the Attorney General and the Public Prosecutor, through the introduction of Articles 145A and 145B of the Federal Constitution, presents a critical opportunity to strengthen prosecutorial independence, reduce the risk of executive interference, and restore public confidence in the criminal justice system.

We, the undersigned civil society organisations, welcome the introduction of the Constitution (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2026 (“the Bill”) as an important step towards long-overdue institutional reform in Malaysia. We were invited by the Parliamentary Special Select Committee to participate in their stakeholder engagement session, during which we presented our submissions and recommendations for the Bill.

However, our analysis finds that the Bill, in its current form, contains several structural gaps that must be addressed to ensure the reform achieves its intended objectives. Without substantive improvements, the separation risks remaining formal rather than meaningful.

In our submission, we highlight four key areas of concern:

  1. Appointment Mechanism for the Public Prosecutor

    The proposed appointment process risks concentrating discretion within a narrow institutional framework. While the Bill transfers the appointment power from the Prime Minister to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the underlying influence of the executive remains, particularly through advisory mechanisms. This approach may inadvertently expose the monarchy to political pressures.

    A more robust, multi-layered appointment process is needed. We recommend the inclusion of Parliament in reviewing and vetting candidates nominated by the relevant commission, thereby ensuring greater transparency, checks and balances, and democratic legitimacy.

  2. Removal Mechanism for the Public Prosecutor

    The removal process must strike a careful balance between safeguarding institutional independence and preventing excessive concentration of power. Procedures for both appointment and removal should be transparent and subject to parliamentary oversight.

    We propose a fixed, non-renewable term of seven years, with a mandatory retirement age of 66 (with a possible six-month extension). In addition, an enabling law should clearly define the grounds, processes, and safeguards for removal, ensuring that no single actor holds disproportionate authority over the position.

  3. Accountability Framework

    Prosecutorial independence must be accompanied by clear and enforceable accountability mechanisms. The Public Prosecutor should be required to table annual reports in Parliament, particularly on cases of significant public interest.

    Furthermore, the Public Prosecutor should be accountable to a designated parliamentary committee, with the obligation to appear when required to answer questions on policy, performance, and administration. Transparent and publicly accessible prosecutorial guidelines should also be established, covering key areas such as charging decisions, evidentiary thresholds, plea bargaining, and discontinuation of proceedings.

  4. Enactment of a Comprehensive Enabling Act

    A dedicated Enabling Act is essential to operationalise the constitutional amendments. This legislation should set out, in detail, the roles and responsibilities of the Public Prosecutor and the prosecution service, including appointment procedures, service structure, ethical standards, and the working relationship between the Attorney General and the Public Prosecutor.

We emphasise that this reform requires coherence across three elements: the proposed constitutional amendments, the enactment of an Enabling Act, and clear limits on the exercise of constitutional discretion. An expansion of the phrase “at his discretion” without adequate safeguards risks undermining accountability. These three components must therefore function in a complementary manner to ensure that constitutional principles are translated into implementation that is transparent, controlled, and accountable.

While the Bill marks an important milestone, its effectiveness will ultimately depend on how these critical issues are addressed. We therefore urge the Legal Affairs Division of the Prime Minister’s Department (BHEUU) and all Members of Parliament to carefully consider these recommendations to ensure that the reform delivers genuine independence, integrity, and public trust in Malaysia’s prosecution system.

Following the submission of the document to BHEUU, we also hope that a presentation session can be considered with relevant stakeholders. We believe such a session would provide an opportunity to further elaborate on the contents and to address any questions requiring clarification.

Jointly issued by:

  • BERSIH
  • C4 Center
  • Projek SAMA
  • IDEAS
  • IKRAM
  • Rasuah Busters
  • Maha Balakrishnan

— ENDS —

Download the Media Statement PDF File Here

For enquiries, please contact:
Ryan Panicker
Assistant Manager, Advocacy and Events
T: 03 – 2070 8881/8882 | E: ryannesh@ideas.org.my

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